The case of Clark v Sunshine Coast Regional Council [2026] QLAC 3 concerned an appeal to the Land Appeal Court of Queensland (Land Appeal Court) against the determination of the Land Court of Queensland (Land Court) in the case of Clark v Sunshine Coast Regional Council [2025] QLC 32 of compensation under the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (Qld) (the Act). 

On 8 December 2023, the Sunshine Coast Regional Council (Council) resumed land at 348 Yandina Bli Bli Road, Maroochy River (Subject Land) to facilitate the development of a recreational precinct. Following resumption, the Subject Land and the adjacent Parklands Conservation Park were nominated as a venue for the Olympics.  

The Subject Land extends to 43.74 hectares and the highest and best use of the Subject Land was agreed to be an improved lifestyle property. Gregory Clark (Applicant) sought compensation in accordance with the Act. Valuers engaged by the respective parties assessed the value of the Subject Land using the direct comparison methodology as at the acquisition date. The valuer engaged by the landowner valued the land at $11,250,000 and the valuer engaged by the Council valued the land at $5,800,000.  

The Land Court preferred the evidence put forward by the Council's valuer and determined the total compensation amount to be $6,187,217.50 comprising the following: 

(a) Land value: $5,800,000. 

(b) Stamp duty: $314,025. 

(c) Disturbance costs: $73,192.50. 

An application to recover part of an advance against compensation and the costs of the proceeding was heard on 6 March 2026 in the decision of Clark v Sunshine Coast Regional Council (No 2) [2026] QLC 2. The Land Court in that case ordered that the Applicant pay the Council $329,422.01 outstanding against the advance, with interest, and 50% of the Council's costs of the proceedings.  

The Land Appeal Court confirmed the decision of the Land Court in respect of the compensation amount, however, held that the parties each bear their own costs finding that the Applicant should not have the compensation amount eroded by an adverse costs order.  

The grounds of appeal put forward by the Applicant were as follows: 

"(a) Did the Court below err in finding that Maroochy River was a 
       'lower order' location? (the location question) 

(b) Did the Court below err in finding that Sale 5 was the 'most instructive' 
      and the 'most comparable' sale? (the Sale 5 issue) 

(c) Did the Court below err in dismissing the summation method of valuation? 
     (the summation method question) 

(d) Should the Court below have applied a 'special value in reverse'?  

(e) Did the Court below err in failing to apply a liberal estimate?" 

The valuers expressed differing opinions on the desirability of Maroochy River as a prestige location and whether the Subject Land should attract a "scarcity premium". Due to limited sales activity in Maroochy River, the majority of comparable sales were sourced from other localities, such as the Malaney-Mapleton area and the Noosa hinterland (at [6]).  

The valuer engaged by the Council gave evidence that there was no evidence to suggest a prestige market exists in Maroochy River and drew a clear distinction between the location of the comparable sales and the Subject Land. He noted that the suburb is a floodplain and is the most populated due to its lower price point (see [7] and [8]). 

The Applicant contended that you cannot draw a meaningful comparison between properties in two alternate locations to determine the value of the Subject Land and that there was positive evidence for "not denigrating" the subject location due to the views, standard of improvements and proximity to amenities (at [9]).  

The Court of Appeal also rejected the submission that a scarcity premium should be applied to the Subject Land given a lack of prestige sales in Maroochy River, confirming that is a lower order location (at [20]). 

The Court considered the most instructive sale to be a 31.39 hectare improved rural lifestyle properly situated at Lake MacDonald, which was described as "sale 5".   

The sale was affected by the presence of high voltage electricity lines, a water supply pipeline and the risk of flooding. The Applicant challenged the Land Court’s conclusion that the effect of easements on property value would be comparable to the impact of flood risk and argued that there was no evidence to support this notion and that the Land Court should have had regard to the temporary impacts of a flood compared with the permanent nature of the easements (see [24] to [25]). 

In determining the value, the Land Court compared the Subject Land to sale 5 on factors including location and the nature of improvements on the land and found that it is a superior rural lifestyle property (at [27]). The Land Appeal Court held that the Land Court was entitled to rely upon the opinion of value stated by the valuer engaged by the Council and rejected any argument by the Applicant that he was denied procedural fairness in respect of this issue (see [28] and [29]). 

The Applicant submitted that the Land Court should have had regard to the summation method, particularly given the lack of comparable sales. The valuer engaged by the Applicant relied on this method as a check method only, and produced a value for the Subject Land approximately 50% higher than the only unimproved comparable sale (at [30]). 

The Land Appeal Court criticised the summation method, noting that a quantity surveyor assesses the depreciated costs of the improvements, rather than the value to the market and that this ignores the possibility of market-based depreciation (at [34]).  

The Land Appeal Court did not favour the evidence of the valuer engaged by the Applicant because the valuer did not apply the summation method to other sales, making it difficult to evaluate its utility as a check method (at [35]). Overall, it was held that there was no error by the Land Court in not considering this method (at [37]).  

The Applicant contended that a premium should be applied to the value of Subject Land due to its location adjoining the Parklands Conservation Park, which offers the owner unique benefits. The valuer engaged by the Applicant also emphasised that the Subject Land was to be utilised in establishing an Olympic venue (at [39]). 

Although the Land Appeal Court acknowledged cases in which a 10% premium has been applied to reflect the special value of a property, the concept of "reverse special value" has not been identified at law (at [40]) 

The valuers agreed on the highest and best use albeit did not quantify, or consider, its greater potential as an Olympic venue (at [40]). Therefore, there was no error by the Land Court in failing to apply a premium due to the advantages of the adjoining land (at [41]).  

If there are two equally plausible results in determining a compensation case, the Court must choose the result that favours the landowner (liberal estimate test). However, if the evidence put forward does not support one of the results, the liberal estimate test will not apply (at [42]).  

The Land Appeal Court did not consider there to be two equally plausible results, finding that the Land Court was entitled to reject the evidence put forward by the valuer engaged by the Applicant (at [43]).  

In determining costs, the Land Appeal Court considered the application of a two stage process as follows: 

"(a) first, determine whether the party claiming costs is eligible for an
       award of costs undersection 27(2) of the ALA; 

(b) second, determine, in the exercise of the Court's discretion whether
      costs should be awarded to the eligible party, in the circumstances
      of the case (s27(1))." 

The first stage was satisfied as the determination for compensation was closer to the offer provided to the Applicant by the Council. As to the second stage, the Land Appeal Court did not consider the Applicant's claim to be vexatious, excessive or unnecessarily burdensome to the Council. Therefore, it was held that each party bear their own costs of the hearings in the Land Court (at [54]). 

Overall, the Land Appeal Court held that the Applicant failed to demonstrate that the Land Court was in error in determining the value of the Subject Land. The substantive appeal was dismissed with written submissions to be made by the parties as to the costs of the appeal to the Land Appeal Court.