PUBLICATIONS circle 23 Apr 2026

Simpler framework, stronger ministerial power: Proposed changes to the Security of Critical Infrastructure regime

By Morgan Lane, Katherine Jones, Andrew Newell and Max Lee

The Australian Government has proposed reforms to the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act to expand ministerial direction powers and strengthen risk management obligations for High Risk Assets. The changes point to heightened regulatory oversight, tougher penalties and increased cybersecurity, governance and supply chain requirements.


In brief

The Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Cth) (SOCI Act) provides the Australian Government with visibility on who owns and controls critical infrastructure in Australia, assurance as to how risk to its functionality is being managed and intervention options where the failure of infrastructure would have national and damaging consequences.

Following an independent review of the SOCI Act by Dr Jill Slay AM and with recent global crises informing an increased focus on security, in March 2026, the Federal Minister for Home Affairs (Minister) announced proposed reforms to that Act. That announcement was accompanied by an exposure draft of proposed changes aimed at strengthening the "critical infrastructure risk management program" (CIRMP) rules in the SOCI Act (Exposure Draft).

The announcement stated the Government’s intention to:

  1. amend the Minister’s directions power under Part 3 of the SOCI Act; and

  2. introduce greater risk management requirements for certain high-risk critical infrastructure asset classes.

Part 1 - Proposed amendments to the SOCI Act

Proposed enhancements to ministerial powers

The Government proposes to strengthen the Minister’s power to give directions under the SOCI Act, to allow for faster and more robust responses to critical infrastructure risks, particularly in urgent situations.

Currently, section 32 of the SOCI Act empowers the Australian Government to issue a direction to a reporting entity of critical infrastructure if "there is a risk of an act or omission that would be prejudicial to security".* This power currently requires the Minister to obtain an Adverse Security Assessment (ASA) from ASIO* (ASA Requirement) and be satisfied that no existing regulatory system could address a given risk (Regulatory Exhaustion Requirement).

The key proposed changes to this power are:

  1. To replace the ASA Requirement with a requirement that the Minister obtain and consider tailored ASIO advice.*

  2. Reduce the Regulatory Exhaustion Requirement and replace it with a requirement that the Minister be satisfied that no less intrusive or existing mechanism would be more effective.

  3. To give the Minister the power to impose conditions on an entity where it faces persistent governance risks (e.g. role-based security vetting, access controls, changes to audit obligations and uplifts to cyber security).

  4. To allow the Minister to address systemic vendor risks across entities or sectors by giving directions to multiple entities at once on items such as stopping the use of certain products, the isolation of technologies, restriction of procurement and controls to be applied.*

  5. To allow an entity to delay disclosure of a cyber security incident where such disclosure would threaten Australia’s national security or public safety.

*See Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth).
*See SOCI Act s 32(3)(c).
*See Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, Proposed amendments to enhance the Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program Rules (CIRMP Rules) (Consultation Paper, 2026).
*See Australian Government Department of Home Affairs, Proposed amendments to the Ministerial Directions Powers in Part 3 of the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Consultation Paper, 2026) 14.

Proposed increases to penalties

The amendments also propose an increase in penalties.

Currently, under Part 3 of the SOCI Act, non-compliance with a ministerial direction carries a maximum penalty of $82,500 (250 penalty units) for individuals and $412,500 (1,250 penalty units) for corporations. The proposed changes will see the maximum penalty increased to $660,000 (2,000 penalty units) for individuals and $3,300,000 (10,000 penalty units) for corporations.

Part 2 - Proposed amendments to the CIRMP Rules

Enhanced CIRMP Rules for responsible entities

A "responsible entity" is a person or body that owns, operates, uses or is otherwise legally designated as responsible for a critical infrastructure asset. A responsible entity is required to adopt and comply with a CIRMP, that is, a written program which identifies and attempts to mitigate the risk of hazards to its critical infrastructure assets.*

Under the power found in section 61 of the SOCI Act*, the Minister created the Security of Critical Infrastructure (Critical infrastructure risk management program) Rules 2023 (Cth) (CIRMP Rules).

The Exposure Draft proposes amendments to the CIRMP Rules introducing "enhanced CIRMP requirements", which would go beyond the existing "baseline CIRMP requirements". The enhanced CIRMP requirements would apply only to high-risk critical infrastructure assets in sectors such as energy, communications, water and transport* (High Risk Assets).

Summary of key proposed changes to the CIRMP Rules 

Proposed section 

A responsible entity for a High Risk Asset would be required to: 

Consider all hazards 

6A 

consider: 

  1. any impairment of the High Risk Asset's functions that could prejudice the social stability, economic stability, national security or defence of Australia; and 

  1. the potential compromise or impairment of the functions of the High Risk Asset as a result of, or in connection with Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI). 

Cyber and information security risks 

8A 

minimise risks associated with: 

  1. updating software, hardware, legacy systems and security systems; 

  1. deploying advanced, novel and emerging technology; and 

  1. offshore remote access to operational technology. 

8A 

meet cyber maturity to level 2 in a recognised framework (including ISO 27001, Essential Eight, NIST CSF 2.0, C2M2, or AESCSF). 

8A 

implement phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication controls. 

Personnel security 

9A 

maintain a process or system which minimises or eliminates the risk of: 

  1. "unauthorised or unsupervised to access to critical systems"; 

  1. "compromise and misuse of credentials" by critical workers; and  

  1. access by non-critical workers. 

Supply chain risk 

10A 

map major suppliers and critical systems across physical and cyber supply chains to identify vulnerabilities. 

10A 

"identify the maximum tolerable outage for the critical infrastructure asset or any of its critical systems, components, major suppliers or providers".* 

10A 

set out the system to assess risks presented by any major suppliers, including: 

  1. exposure to FOCI and legal requirements; 

  1. sanctions or jurisdictional constraints;  

  1. the degree of access or control suppliers have over the High Risk Asset; and 

  1. any steps to "minimise or eliminate" the impact of the hazard. 

Physical and natural hazards 

11A 

"centrally manage physical security and natural hazards” and, where practical, "minimise or eliminate the risk", taking into account how cyber incidents, personnel risks or supply chain disruptions could have physical consequences. 

This would involve the entity providing, among other things, the "location, ownership, and nature of the site" and "sensitive areas" that hold any critical business data, systems and components. 

What SOCI Act businesses should be thinking about now

Consultation on the proposed reforms to the ministerial directions power and the Exposure Draft close on 1 May 2026. Recordings of the "town hall" presentation and discussion sessions are available here. Entities planning to provide feedback on both proposals should note that separate submissions are required for each.

Although the reforms are subject to consultation and yet to be made, the direction of policy is clear for businesses that own, operate or support critical infrastructure which can prepare by:

  1. assessing whether any of their assets would be a High Risk Asset under the proposed section 4A(1) in the Exposure Draft;

  2. mapping their supply chains and identifying FOCI;

  3. reviewing their cyber security systems and policies;

  4. reviewing personnel security controls;

  5. reviewing their governance arrangements; and

  6. conducting gap analysis against the Exposure Draft, particularly in relation to cyber security.

Conclusion 

For further information relating to the SOCI Act, please contact the Technology & Data team. 

This is commentary published by Colin Biggers & Paisley for general information purposes only. This should not be relied on as specific advice. You should seek your own legal and other advice for any question, or for any specific situation or proposal, before making any final decision. The content also is subject to change. A person listed may not be admitted as a lawyer in all States and Territories. Colin Biggers & Paisley, Australia 2026

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