The case of Moreton Bay Regional Council v Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 23 concerned an application for leave to the Court of Appeal (Court of Appeal) by the Moreton Bay Regional Council (Council) against the determination by the Land Appeal Court of Queensland (Land Appeal Court) in relation to the proper construction of section 16 of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967 (the Act).

The Court of Appeal considered the interpretation of section 16 of the Act, finding that section 16(1A) provided a right to claim "costs and expenses" albeit that "[t]he incurring of those outlays will likely require a nexus with the giving of the notice of intention to resume…" (at [85]). It was held that the preliminary question posed originally in the Land Court of Queensland (Land Court) as to the limit of compensation under section 16 of the Act could not be answered definitively on the current arguments advanced and did not reflect the true controversy between the parties. The matter was remitted to the Land Court for determination according to law (see [86] and [87]).

Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd (Respondent) owned land in Caboolture South partially improved by the Heritage Plaza Shopping Centre. On 30 March 2015, it applied for a development permit for a material change of use. Two subsequent notices of intention to resume were issued by the Council to take a portion of the land for drainage and easement purposes, resulting in a refusal of the development application which the Respondent successfully appealed in the Planning and Environment Court of Queensland and the development application approved subject to conditions (see Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2017] QPEC 56 and [4] to [9]). 

The Council purported to apply to the Minister to seek to take the portion of the land and that decision was deemed to be of no effect by the Supreme Court of Queensland, and the notices of intention to resume (Notices) were discontinued (see Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council & Anor [2020] QSC 84).

In the Land Court, the Respondent submitted that it incurred various costs and expenses as a consequence of the Notices (at [13]) and the Land Court considered a preliminary question as to the interpretation of section 16 of the Act and took a narrow view deciding that a claim for compensation under that section is limited to the following (see [15] and [16] and Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council (No 2) [2024] QLC 24 which was the subject of our June 2025 article):

• "out of pocket expenses in the nature of legal, valuation and other professional fees…reasonably incurred; themselves reasonable; and which are incurred in connection with the consideration of and/or in the preparation of a claim for compensation following the resumption of land foreshadowed by the notice of intention to resume…"; and

• "any actual damage done to the land by the constructing authority."

The Respondent appealed to the Land Appeal Court which relevantly held as follows (see [28] to [30] and Genamson Holdings Pty Ltd v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2025] QLAC 2): 

• The Land Court erred in accepting that the costs and expenses claimable under section 16(1A) of the Act are limited to the amount which can be recovered under chapter 17A of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) but that this does not mean all forms of financial loss are "costs and expenses". It was held that the prohibition should not be interpreted more narrowly than is necessary, and that the question should be answered so as not to limit the claim for compensation.

• "[T]he phrase 'costs and expenses' in s 16(1A) should not be construed as limiting a claim for compensation to the recovery of legal costs and disbursements. It is, however, clear that the words give Genamson no right to claim loss or damage. What Genamson can claim as costs and expenses will be a question for the hearing member." 

The Council appealed to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against the decision of the Land Appeal Court.

Section 16 of the Act relevantly states as follows [our emphasis]:

"(1)    A constructing authority may at any time before the publication
          of the gazette resumption notice, serve upon every person who
          has been served with a notice of intention to resume a further
          notice stating that the constructing authority is discontinuing the
          resumption of the land concerned.

(1A)   Service of the further notice shall discontinue the resumption
          concerned and no person shall have any claim for compensation
          or other right or remedy whatsoever against the constructing
          authority for any loss or damage alleged to have been occasioned
          (directly or indirectly) by the service of the notice of intention to
          resume or the discontinuance of the resumption except a claim
          for compensation for costs and expenses incurred by the person
          who was served with the notice and any actual damage done to
          the land concerned by the constructing authority.

(1B)    The constructing authority and the claimant may agree upon the
           amount of the compensation to be paid under subsection (1A) or,
           upon the reference of either of them, such amount may be
           determined by the Land Court.

(1C)    However, the constructing authority may have such costs and
           expenses taxed by the proper officer of the Supreme Court under
           the rules of that court and that no person shall be entitled to
           compensation in excess of the value of his or her estate or interest
           in the land.

…"

The key issue in dispute between the parties related to whether the phrase "such costs and expenses" in section 16(1C) of the Act operates to define and limit the meaning of "costs and expenses incurred" in section 16(1A) of the Act (at [42]).

The Court of Appeal considered the exclusion expressed in section 16(1A) of the Act that "…no person shall have any claim for compensation or other right or remedy whatsoever…for any loss or damage..." This exclusion does not remove the right to compensation under section 12 of the Act, rather it operates to remove any claims made in connection to the service of the notice of intention to resume (at [45]).

Despite no express requirement for the "costs and expenses incurred" to be related to the service of the notice, the Court of Appeal considered that there is a requirement to establish some form of causative nexus (at [46]).

The Court held that, in the context of the Act, the expression "costs and expenses incurred" should be given its ordinary meaning, namely, outlays incurred (whether yet paid or not). In determining whether a claim for compensation falls within the scope of section 16(1A) there must be (at [58]):

"(a)    costs or expenses incurred, being an outlay (paid or to be paid);

(b)    by the recipient of the notice;

(c)    with whatever nexus (if any) is required by the section with the
        service of the notice of intention to resume or the discontinuance
        of the resumption."

Each category of compensation contended for by the Respondent was dealt with in turn. 

Firstly, a claim relating to additional costs to obtain development approval was considered to fall within the scope of "costs and expenses" incurred (at [60]).
Some of the expenses raised in the second category were considered to fall within the scope of "costs and expenses", however the limited information provided precluded the loss of rent as being classified as a cost or expense (at [61]).

The third category is holding costs such as land tax, interest or rates incurred due to not being able to realise the development potential of the land. The issue identified related to whether the Notices delayed the receipts that would have reimbursed the expenses, rather than causing the expenses themselves, which would render them non compensable under section 16(1A) of the Act (at [62]).

The fourth category of reasonable legal, valuation and other professional costs appear to fall within the scope of "costs and expenses" incurred (at [63]). 

Section 16(1C) of the Act provides a mechanism for the constructing authority to have the claimant's "costs and expenses" assessed by a proper officer if required (at [64]).
The Respondent submitted that the provision should operate such that the assessment of costs and expenses incurred are dealt with under the scope of rule 678(1) of the UCPR, with the balance to be assessed by the Land Court in accordance with section 16(1B) of the Act (at [68]).

This construction was rejected by the Court of Appeal, finding that the use of the words "such costs and expenses" relates directly to the "costs and expenses" referred to in section 16(1A) of the Act. On that view, section 16(1C) of the Act may not limit what can be claimed under section 16(1A) of the Act, because the assessment mechanism can be applied to the costs claimed (at [74]).

The Court of Appeal concluded that the Land Appeal Court erred in its answer of the preliminary question. The Court of Appeal held that the question is not capable of being answered with respect to the current stage of the proceeding and arguments advanced by the parties. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal granted the appeal in part, to the extent of setting aside the Land Appeal Court's findings with respect to the preliminary question, and remitted the matter to the Land Court for determination in accordance with the law (at [90]).